Disability Law Blog

Garza v. Barnhart, No. 04-2123, __F.3d__ (8th Cir., Feb. 15, 2005)

The Eighth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, finds that a claimant with fibromyalgia (FM) was not disabled prior to May 1999, her date last insured, but that the ALJ's "misunderstanding" about fibromyalgia warranted a remand to consider whether FM, first diagnosed in May 2000, was a severe impariment and, if so, whether it was disabling:

In summarizing the medical evidence, the ALJ mentioned Dr. Rooney's May 2000 fibromyalgia diagnosis, but the ALJ did not discuss specifically other physicians' subsequent references to fibromyalgia; and the ALJ specifically stated that Garza's symptoms of muscle aches and pains had not been substantiated by objective medical testing. We thus agree with Garza that the record indicates the ALJ misunderstood fibromyalgia. See Forehand, 364 F.3d at 987 (noting (1) fibromyalgia is a chronic condition, usually diagnosed after eliminating other conditions; (2) no confirming diagnostic tests exist; and (3) our court has long recognized fibromyalgia might be disabling); Nguyen v. Chater, 75 F.3d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding of no severity is limited to medical impairment(s) that would have no more than minimal effect on claimants ability to work).

The Court affirmed the ALJ's credibility finding, his handling of the opinions of a treating social worker and a reviewing psychologist, and his discounting of a treating physician's assessment of physical limitations.

Benecke v. Barnhart, No. 03-15155, __ F.3d__ (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2004)

The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher, reversed and remanded for an award of benefits in a fibromyalgia case. The case is interesting procedurally:  The District Court had granted Benecke's motion for summary judgment in part, holding that the ALJ had erroneously discounted her pain testimony and the opinions of her treating physicians. Since the agency did not cross-appeal the district court's partial grant of summary judgment, the only issue considered by the Court was whether the District Court abused its discretion by remanding the case for further proceedings rather than for an award. The Court found that the District Court abused its discretion and remanded the case for an award of benefits.

The Court also created a new basis for remanding for payment of benefits:

We now clarify that in the unusual case in which it is clear from the record that the claimant is unable to perform gainful employment in the national economy, even though the vocational expert did not address the precise work limitations established by the improperly discredited testimony, remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate.

The Court goes on to say: "Allowing the Commissioner to decide the issue again would create an unfair “heads we win; tails, let’s play again” system of disability benefits adjudication."

There's much more here. A must-read opinion.