Disability Law Blog

Goad v. Barnhart, No. 04-1363, __F.3d__ (8th Cir., Feb. 17, 2005)

The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Michael J. Melloy, vacates and remands a denial of Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) fees in a Social Security disability case to determine if "the Commissioner's position regarding the initial denial of benefits was substantially justified." Interesting facts in brief: ALJ denies claim. Claimant appeals and eventually arrives in District Court. Claimant files new claim, alleging onset the day after date on ALJ decision, and second claim is approved. District Court remands first case without knowledge of the second.

Claimant files for EAJA fees and costs. Time goes by. Before MJ awards EAJA fees, claimant abandons first claim (hearing notice says that the ALJ will consider the period covered by second successful claim). MJ approves fees.

Commissioner files objections and notifies District Court ex parte that first claim had been withdrawn, attaching copy of ALJ decision. District Court denies EAJA fees and costs: "“[a] plaintiff who failed to supply the Court with information relevant to the matter pending cannot later be heard to complain of a violation of due process rights when the Court is made aware of such information. [Mr. Goad’s] failure to supply known and relevant information in a timely fashion waives his opportunity to explain that information at a later date.” Claimant appeals.

The Court says the District Court abused its discretion:

During oral arguments in this case, the Commissioner conceded the impropriety of her ex parte communication concerning Mr. Goad’s withdrawn claim. As noted above, withdrawal of the remanded claim may or may not have been related to the merits of the Commissioner’s position in the prior litigation. We believe then, that at a minimum, reliance on the ex parte communication improperly deprived Mr. Goad of the opportunity to explain his reasons for withdrawal. Also, we note that because it was the Commissioner’s burden to prove substantial justification, Mr. Goad was under no duty to supplement the record by notifying the district court of the outcome on remand. Accordingly, his failure to do so cannot serve as a waiver of his right to rebut evidence presented by the Commissioner.

The case is remanded to determine the issue of substantial justification.

Oral argument audiofile is available on the 8th Circuit website.

Golembiewski v. Barnhart, No. 03-3382, __ F.3d __ (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 2004)

The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Senior Circuit Judge William J. Bauer, finds that he District Court judge abused his discretion in denying an application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA):

Strong language against the government’s position in an opinion discussing the merits of a key issue is evidence in support of an award of EAJA fees. . . .  We did not reject any issue raised by the plaintiff on appeal nor did we adopt or affirm any position taken by the Commissioner. This is exactly the “strong language against the government’s position” in a merits opinion which should establish lack of substantial justification in the ALJ’s decision and in the Commissioner’s defense of that position.

EAJA fees of $325/hour in Connecticut Medicare Case

From law.com: A District Court judge in Connecticut awarded attorney's fees of $325/hour to attorneys for the Center for Medicare Advocacy based on the special expertise exception under EAJA. More of a curiosity for us in the Fourth Circuit:

Federal circuits are split over what constitutes "distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful of the litigation in question," the phrase used by the U.S Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood, construing the EAJA in 1988. The 7th, 9th and 11th circuits broadly construe Pierce to mean expertise in a particular area of the law, such as immigration or Social Security law. The narrower view, held by the D.C., 4th and 5th circuits, "requires technical or other education outside the field of American law," before fees are enhanced.