Disability Law Blog

Butts v. Barnhart, No. 03-6115, __F3d.__ (2nd Cir. Nov. 2, 2004)

The Second Circuit, in an interesting decision by Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr., holds that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review when reviewing a District Court's decision whether to remand for further proceedings or remand for calculation of benefits. The Court also held that because the decision to remand is discretionary "the principles calling for some evaluation of relative hardships that govern a discretionary selection of alternative remedies apply." Therefore, the District Court must evaluate the hardship that further delay creates for the claimant and consider imposing a time limit on the subsequent proceedings:

"In this case, the past delay is of such magnitude -- years -- that a time limit is imperative. We therefore instruct the district court to direct that further proceedings before an ALJ be completed within 60 days of the issuance of the district court’s order and, if that decision is a denial of benefits, a final decision of the Commissioner be rendered within 60 days of Butts' appeal from the ALJ’s decision. The district court’s order should provide that, if these deadlines are not observed, a calculation of benefits owed Butts must be made immediately."

The Second joins the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits in finding that an abuse of discretion standard applies: See Nelson v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2000); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 504, 505 (8th Cir. 2000). The First Circuit reviews such decisions de novo, Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001).

Benecke v. Barnhart, No. 03-15155, __ F.3d__ (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2004)

The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher, reversed and remanded for an award of benefits in a fibromyalgia case. The case is interesting procedurally:  The District Court had granted Benecke's motion for summary judgment in part, holding that the ALJ had erroneously discounted her pain testimony and the opinions of her treating physicians. Since the agency did not cross-appeal the district court's partial grant of summary judgment, the only issue considered by the Court was whether the District Court abused its discretion by remanding the case for further proceedings rather than for an award. The Court found that the District Court abused its discretion and remanded the case for an award of benefits.

The Court also created a new basis for remanding for payment of benefits:

We now clarify that in the unusual case in which it is clear from the record that the claimant is unable to perform gainful employment in the national economy, even though the vocational expert did not address the precise work limitations established by the improperly discredited testimony, remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate.

The Court goes on to say: "Allowing the Commissioner to decide the issue again would create an unfair “heads we win; tails, let’s play again” system of disability benefits adjudication."

There's much more here. A must-read opinion.