Disability Law Blog

Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, No. 04-2251 (7th Cir. Sept. 23, 2005)

Another significant decision out of the Seventh Circuit involving inference of an onset date when contemporaneous medical evidence isn't available.  Circuit Judge Diane P. Wood, writing for the Court, finds that the ALJ did not properly apply SSR 83-20  when he failed to explore alternative sources of evidence to determine the onset date when the medical evidence itself was not conclusive.  Quoting from SSR 83-20, the Court wrote:

Where no reasonable inference is possible based on the available evidence and additional medical evidence is not available, “it may be necessary to explore other sources of documentation . . . from family members, friends, and former employees to ascertain why medical evidence is not available for the pertinent period and to furnish additional evidence regarding the course of the individual’s condition.”

The case also presents an interesting procedural history. This reached the Court on the Commissioner's appeal of a District Court's decision to reverse and remand for an award of benefits. The Court held that although the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, an award of benefits was not appropriate merely because the agency displayed "obduracy" in the case. "Obduracy is not a ground on which to award benefits; the evidence properly in the record must demonstrate disability." The case was therefore remanded to allow additional lay evidence to be taken. (The Court did not mention whether the District Court abused its discretion in remanding for payment of benefits. In fact, it said nothing about the standard of review.)

The Court's decision also touches on the ALJ's duty to explain his reasons for his RFC assessment pursuant to SSR 96-8p, the duty to develop the record and the proper approach to lay witness testimony.

A meaty decision well worth an hour of your time.

An MP3 of oral argument is available here, and the briefs are here.

Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2004)

An opinion by Circuit Judge William J. Bauer affirming a defective ALJ decision with respect to crediblity analysis. Leaving aside its treatment of SSR 83-20, the Court fails to quote SSR 96-7p regarding assessment of a claimant's credibility:

"It is also not enough for the adjudicator simply to recite the factors that are described in the regulations for evaluating symptoms. The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements and the reasons for that weight. This documentation is necessary in order to give the individual a full and fair review of his or her claim, and in order to ensure a well-reasoned determination or decision."

Ignoring this language, and focusing on Polaski, an 8th Circuit decision (?) which lists factors to be considered in assessing credibility, the Court concluded that the "ALJ was aware of these requirements and followed them in making her decision." (Page 10) How an awareness of the factors is morphed into a "well-reasoned" decision is not apparent from the Court's opinion. Presumably, if the ALJ indicates in her decision that she considered a Ruling, she must have applied that Ruling in the correct manner.

One other oddity: The Court refers to "residual functioning capacity" not "residual functional capacity" in describing RFC. Is there something in 7th Circuit caselaw that describes RFC that way?