Disability Law Blog

Moore v. Barnhart, No. 04-13176 (11th Cir. April 12, 2005)

The Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, reverses and remands a concurrent claim for benefits based on fibromyalgia, right shoulder separation, varus deformity of the knee, cervical disc disease, headaches and depression. The Court found no error in the ALJ's crediblity determination, his treatment of the treating chiropractor's opinion or his determination of RFC. In failing to complete a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF) or comply with its mode of analysis, however, the Court found error requiring remand:

Furthermore, the fact that the ALJ complied with the PRTF method and regulations when he first evaluated Moore’s claim in 1996, prior to remand, is not sufficient to excuse his failure to do so here. Particularly where Moore has presented non-frivolous evidence suggesting that her mental condition has deteriorated since the vacated 1996 decision, the ALJ’s prior evaluation is insufficient to deny Moore another evaluation of her mental impairments’ effect on her RFC through the date of the ALJ’s 2001 decision.

We thus join our sister circuits in holding that where a claimant has presented a colorable claim of mental impairment, the social security regulations require the ALJ to complete a PRTF, append it to the decision, and incorporate its mode of analysis into his findings and conclusions. Failure to do so requires remand.

Dyer v. Barnhart, __F.3d__, No. 04-11040 (11th Cir., Jan. 5, 2005)

In a case appealed by the Commissioner, the Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, finds that the District Court did not given proper deference to the ALJ's decision:

In all events, there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ's decision, as was not the case here, is not a broad rejection which is "not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole." . . . Our standard of review is, as it is for the district court, whether the ALJ's conclusion as a whole was supported by substantial evidence in the record. . . . In reversing the ALJ, the district court improperly reweighed the evidence and failed to give substantial deference to the Commissioner's decision.

Shinn ex rel. Shinn v. Commissioner, No. 03-14229 (11th Cir. Nov. 30, 2004)

The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat, holds that testimony of a nonmedical source "concerning the repeated onset of what, to all outward appearances, seem to be pain crises or vaso-occlusive crises" should have been considered by the ALJ in determining whether a child's SSI claimant met the listing for sickle cell disease (listing 107.05). Nonmedical evidence is permissible under 20 C.F.R. § 416.928 to prove the existence of symptoms, and the Court holds that vaso-occlusive crises are a symptom of sickle cell disease. While the regulations regarding nonmedical source testimony are "intricate, confusing, and fail to provide a clear answer . . ."

The ALJ erred in failing to consider the testimony of Yvonne’s mother. . . . [Her] testimony suggests that Yvonne suffered episodes that closely resemble those Dr. Wall specifically warned “could” happen, fit the description of vaso-occlusive episodes, were treated as vaso-occlusive episodes, and resemble other crises for which Yvonne was hospitalized that were expressly declared vaso-occlusive episodes by medical personnel. Once the testimony of Yvonne’s mother is considered, it builds a persuasive case that Yvonne suffered from "recent, frequent severe vaso-occlusive crises."

The case is remanded for a new hearing.

Note:  For more on Judge Tjoflat, read Howard Bashman's 20 Questions published August 4, 2003.

Philips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)

Opinion by Judge Hull:

Given that the ALJ limited Phillips’s employment at the sedentary level to jobs that do not involve multi-tasking, the ALJ must specifically determine in the first instance whether such a restriction significantly limits Phillips’s basic work skills; that is, whether there are a wide range of sedentary jobs that do not require m ulti-tasking. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1559 (“The ALJ must make a specific finding as to whether the nonexertional limitations are severe enough to preclude a wide range of employment at the given work capacity level indicated by the exertional limitations.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The ALJ must address and resolve this issue before relying on the grids.

pp. 26-27